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From Concession to Joint Venture Agreement: Restructuring
Mineral Agreements - A Casestudy from Ghana*
S.K.B. Asante** and S.K. Date-Bah*
INTRODUCTION
That the present world economic system or, as it is more frequently
called these days, the present international economic order is considered
by the developing countries to be inequitable is now a hackneyed truism.
What is of interest is how the amelioration of the lot of the third world
in the international economic order is to be achieved. The strategy
adopted within the United Nations system has been a strategy of
negotiation. But more radical voices have been heard in the third world
which have called for confrontation with international capitalism and
disengagement from it.
The authors of this article consider that the negotiation option
should be studied to see its limits and its potentialities. Is it really
possible for third world countries to bargain themselves out of
dependency and if not what can be achieved through negotiation? With a
view to throwing some light on these general issues, the authors mean to
examine in detail one particular series of negotiations. Although these
negotiations are not a part of the state-to-state UNCTAD series of
negotiations, they are seen as an inevitable part of the package of
negotiations entailed by the adoption of the negotiation option implicit
in the U.N. policies and activities aimed at the establishment of a New
International Economic Order. The series of negotiations to be studied
in this article pertain to the restructuring of the contractual relations
of a transnational corporation with a host developing country. What is
to be assessed is the extent to which adoption of the negotiation option
and of the particular negotiation strategies and tactics aided or caused
detriment to the national interest of the host country concerned.
A. THE COLONIAL CONCESSION OF ASHANTI GOLDFIELD CORPORATION:
FOUNDATION OF THE OLD ORDER.
As can be guessed from the former name of Ghana, the Gold Coast,
goldmining is an ancient activity within the area now comprised in
Ghana. The gold was produced principally from within the territory of
the old Ashanti Kingdom, both by alluvial mining methods and underground
mining techniques.1 However, other areas of Ghana also produced gold.
The rich gold ores of Obuasi and other areas in the old Denkyira Kingdom
had been worked as far back as the Seventeenth Century.2 But it was
the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (A.G.C.) which first applied western
mining technology to these ancient workings.
The title on which A.G.C. based its right of access to the gold ores
it mined from 1897 onwards predates the British assumption of sovereignty
over Ashanti. British sovereignty over Ashanti was achieved by conquest
in the Yaa Asantewa War of 1900 and was confirmed by an Order-in-Council
of 26 September, 1901, which annexed the territory of Ashanti consequent
upon its having "been conquered by His Majesty's forces."
The founder of Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, one Edwin A. Cade,
bought the lease of the goldfields at Obuasi from their local Fanti
owners, J.P. Brown, J.E. Ellis and J.E. Biney in August, 1895.3 Cade
had, prior to his departure from England to the Gold Coast in search of
investment opportunities there, in 1895 formed the C6te D'or Mining
Company in London.4 In the agreement in which he bought the lease of
the Obuasi goldfields from the three Fanti merchants, he acted for this
C6te D'or Mining Company and so it was to that company that the
concessions of the three Cape Coast merchants were transferred. 5 The
role of these local merchants in these transactions is quite
interesting. Recognizing the mineral wealth of the lands in question,
they had ventured into the then independent Ashanti Kingdom to negotiate
with the local chiefs of the area, "Yaw Boyskey6 then King of Bekwai,"
according to one of the recitals of the 1897 A.G.C. lease, and "Kwaku
Mkansa then King of Adansi." By an indenture dated 1st August, 1895
between the said Yaw Boyakey of Bekwai and J.E. Biney, J.E. Ellis and
J.P. Brown, an earlier indenture executed by a prior "King of Bekwai"
dated 3rd March, 1890 had been confirmed and modified and the land it
dealt with had been leased to the three Cape Coast merchants for a term
of 99 years from 3rd March, 1890 "at the early rent of £100 until the
said premises should be sold or disposed of and after the lapse of one
year from the time when the said premises should have been sold or
disposed of at the yearly rent of £133.,,7
Commenting on the role of the three merchants, David Kimble remarks
that "this seems to be a classic case where Africans had recognized
economic opportunities, but lacked the capital and technique to develop
them."'8 The three merchants also entered into an Agreement dated 15th
August, 1895 with Kwaku Nkansa, "King of Adansi," which purported to
confirm the Indenture executed by Yaw Boyakey, subject to the payment of
a yearly rent of £66 to-the King of Adansi.9 The subject matter of
these agreements was land about one hundred square miles in dimensions
situated in the Obuasi area. The three Fanti concessionaires were
associated with "the Ashanti Exploration Company."10 The
concessionaires are said to have commenced mining operations on this
land, but presumably using traditional techniques. The reason why the
concessionaires had to seek title from both the Adanshene and Bekwaehene
was that, although Obuasi was part of Adansi, the Adansi had been
defeated in 1886 and ever since the Bekwaihene had administered the
Adansi lands, even though they still belonged to the Adansi community
whose stool the Adansihene occupied. At the time the concessions were
granted, the Adansihene was still in exile in the Gold Coast Colony, to
the South of the independent Ashanti Kingdom.11
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In spite of the initial working of the concessions by their original
owners, the language of the provisio on rents quoted above would seem to
suggest that they had contemplated resale of the lease right from the
beginning. Speculation, therefore, seems to have been part of their
design.
After the execution of the agreement transferring the interest of the
Fanti concessionaires to the C6te D'or Company, Cade travelled in August
1895 to Bekwae to seek the consent of the Bekwaehene (Yaw Boakye) to the
transfer. He succeeded in securing such approval not only from him, but
also from the Adansehene Kwaku Nkansa.12 Subsequently, in January
1896, the British Government sent troops into Ashanti. They met with no
opposition and occupied Kumasi on 17th January, 1896. After this British
occupation of Ashanti, the Secretary of State for the Colonies informed
the C6te D'or Mining Company on 27th April, 1896 that the company's
concession would be recognized as valid.13 In 1897 Cade formed the
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation.1 4 The C6te D'or Company was
subsequently liquidated and its assets taken over by the A.G.C.15
On 3rd June, 1897 an agreement was entered into by the Governor of
the Gold Coast, the three original Cape Coast concessionaires, the C6te
D'or Company Ltd. and the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd. This
agreement, which has already been referred to several times in this
article as the 1897 A.G.C. lease, formed the legal basis of A.G.C.'s gold
mining operations at Obuasi till 1969.
This 1897 A.G.C. lease recited the previous lease acquired by the
three Cape Coast concessionaires and the Agreement by which they
transferred their interest to the C6te D'or Company Ltd. It further
recited that the three Cape Coast concessionaires and the C6te D'or
Company Ltd. had requested the Governor of the Gold Coast to enter into
the Agreement with the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd. One of the
recitals claimed that "the Territories of Bekwai and Adansi are now under
the protection of Her Majesty, the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland,
Empress of India, and are under the control of the Governor on behalf of
Her Majesty."
But in June 1897, it was by no means clear whether Great Britain had
acquired sovereignty over Ashanti. As Ivor Wilks writes,
The decision of Agyeman Prempe's government in 1896
not to offer resistance to the British expeditionary
force, had been in certain respects itself a finely
calculated act of resistance in view of the gross
disparity in the military resources of the two
powers. As a result of the decision the British found
themselves, although in military occupation of
Ashanti, nonetheless without adequate legal standing
there: having claims to legitimacy neither by treaty
with the lawful government nor by right of conquest.
The various agreements which the British signed with
individual amanhene - often their own nominees - were
of dubious legal validity, and one of the reasons for
the decision to arrest and deport the Ashantehene and
many of his senior officers was undoubtedly the fact
that no restraint existed in international law upon
their entering still into treaty relations with
Britain's colonial rivals, France or Germany." 16
In spite of this shaky foundation of the legal authority claimed by
the Governor of the Gold Coast over the Obuasi lands, which is to be
implied from the passage quoted above, the A.G.C. lease was cast in the
form of a grant of authority by the Governor of the Gold Coast to A.G.C.
"to occupy during the term of 90 years from the 1st day of January, 1897
for the purposes and subject to the conditions hereinafter mentioned,"
64,000 acres of land in the Obuasi area.
As already mentioned above, the indenture under which the Ashanti
Goldfields Corporation sought to obtain title to the Obuasi concessions
was executed by the Governor of the Gold Coast at the request of C6te
D'or Company and the three Cape Coast merchants. Presumably, then, the
Cote D'or Company was seeking to transfer its title under the concessions
to the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation and considered that the Governor's
signature of the documents would assure Ashanti Goldfields Corporation a
better title. The three last recitals were to the following effect:
And whereas the Governor does not admit the
validity of the Concessions or any of them but has in
exercise of his authority agreed at the request of the
said parties hereto of the second and third parts to
authorise [Ashanti Goldfields Corporation] to occupy
the said land as being part of the unoccupied lands of
the said protectorate.
And whereas for the purpose of settling all
disputes or questions as to the validity of the
Concessions or any of them it was agreed by the said
parties hereto that the Concessions should be
surrendered and delivered to the Governor and
cancelled and that in lieu thereof the Company should
accept such an Authority to occupy the said land as is
hereinafter contained.
And whereas in pursuance of such Agreement the
Concessions have been surrendered and delivered to the
Governor and have been cancelled.
These recitals raise very interesting issues as to the Governor's
authority to grant what has subsequently come to be known as the Ashanti
Goldfields Lease. The year of the lease was also the year of the Public
Lands Bill and may explain the Governor's claim of authority to grant
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation authority to occupy the land in question
"as being part of the unoccupied lands" of Ashanti. The Public Lands
Bill, however, never became law and it is to be doubted whether the
Governor had any lawful authority to grant any rights of occupation of
any unoccupied lands in Ashanti. In the Public Lands Bill, the colonial
government made an abortive attempt to vest in itself all unoccupied
lands in the Gold Coast. The attempt was vehemently opposed by the local
peoples and had to be abandoned.
Whatever rights the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation received could be
no more than those vested in the C6te D'or Company. But the mode of
transfer of those rights poses problems, because the C6te D'or Company
did not purport to transfer its rights to A.G.C. Rather, the concessions
had been delivered up to the Governor and cancelled. In strict analysis,
upon such cancellation, title in the concessions should revert to the
Bekwai and Adansi stools. It is difficult to see why such cancellation
should result in the Governor obtaining title to the lands in question.
Perhaps a plausible way of finding some legal basis for A.G.C.'s
operations at Obuasi pursuant to the Governor's.lease is to argue that
since the three Cape Coast merchants, as well as the C6te D'or Company,
joined in the indenture which purported to grant A.G.C. a lease of the
Obuasi lands, and since it was the intention of all the parties that the
mining rights in the land be transferred to A.G.C., the sense of the
document must be taken to be a transfer of title to the Governor, who in
turn transferred his title to A.G.C. But if this was the only purpose of
the document, then one is hard put to see the point in this circuitous
transaction, since the Governor's title would not be any better than that
of his transferors.
This agreement then demonstrates the problem of concessionaires which
was solved under the subsequent Concessions Ordinance. Under the
Concessions Ordinance, after an inquiry by the High Court, if a
certificate of validity is given, then the concessionaire obtains a
guaranteed title. The A.G.C. lease was such an attempt by a foreign
concessionaire to obtain a guaranteed title. It is doubtful whether, as
a matter of strict law, such a guaranteed title was achieved. But, no
doubt, a political guarantee was achieved. The Governor, being a
signatory to the so-called lease, could be expected to safeguard the
concessionaire from any interference. Indeed, this so-called lease was
never questioned by even the post-independence governments.
Whatever was the legal basis of the Governor's authority so to do, he
did purport, as already indicated, to grant to A.G.C. authority to occupy
for a term of 90 years from 1st January, 1897 the present area of
operation of the A.G.C. containing some 64,000 acres of land. The said
land was to be held on the following conditions. A.G.C. was to make the
following payments to the Colonial Treasurer of the Gold Coast:
a) a commuted royalty of £500 per annum during the
first five years of the agreement;
b) a royalty of 5% on the gross value of all gold
and other metal, precious stones and mineral oil
won from the land with effect from 1st January,
1903; [this royalty could be commuted for any one
or more years for such an annual sum as was
agreed on between the Governor and A.G.C.] and
such commuted royalty was to be paid half-yearly
in advance. In any year in which no such
commutation had been done the agreement provided
that if the royalty amounted to less than £250,
then £250 was to be paid in lieu of the royalty.
c) a sum of £133 per annum which was to be received
by the Colonial Treasurer on behalf of the person
recognized by the Governor as the "Head-Chief or
King of Bekwai" and
d) a sum of £66 per annum to be received by the
Colonial Treasurer on behalf of the person
recognized by the Governor as the "Head-Chief or
King of Adansi."
A.G.C.'s use of the land comprised in the lease was not to be limited
to mining operations, but was to extend also to "trading, cultivation of
rubber or agricultural produce or for any other purposes which may from
time to time have previously been expressly sanctioned in writing by the
Governor." For these purposes, A.G.C. could
make roads and bridges, lay out townships in
connection with any mining or agricultural operations
and erect buildings and machinery and cut and fell
timber [but without destroying rubber trees or other
valuable timber] and use any waters but this Agreement
is to be subject in every respect to the existing
rights of any native or natives in respect of the said
land or any part thereof and accordingly every
operation hereby authorised must be conducted so as in
no way to affect or interfere with any (such)
rights.17
This 1897 concession to A.G.C. was thus an archetypal concession
under which an investor from the colonial metropole gained access to the
natural resources of a colonial people on very unfair terms. Recent
writers have laid bare18 the exploitative nature of many such classical
concession agreements. The sanguine view of such agreements by earlier
writers such as Carlston are not shared by many lawyers from the third
world. Carlston wrote:
A concession agreement reflects one aspect of the
process of foreign investment. It is an instrument of
coordination whereby a state and a foreign investor
establish a complementary system of relationships in
the conduct of an enterprise for a defined period. It
includes the grant by the state to the concessionaire
of the privilege to enter into thesystem of economic
relationships defined by the instrument. Its
essential character, however, is that of co-ordination
and the grant of privilege by the state is but an
incident of the co-ordinated activity contemplated by
the agreement. It may more appropriately be termed an
international economic development contract. It is
characteristically found to be a means for the
development of the mineral resources of the state.19
Why is this conception of the concession as an instrument of
coordination in aid of economic development increasingly challenged by
third world scholars? The objection is to the distorting effect of such
concession agreements, which typically established enclaves within the
local economy with not much impact on the general development of the
local economy. The natural resources of the colony were subjected to the
ownership and control of foreign enterprise in whose equity capital there
was usually no local participation, public or private.2 0 This old
emphasis on the co-ordination role of the concession concealed the very
real conflicts of interest between foreign concessionaires and host
countries. The foreign ownership of the companies meant the repatriation
abroad of the super-profits made from the extractive industries.
Returning to the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation lease of 1897, one
needs to stress the fact that the land leased was already known to bear
gold ores. This was not the case of land being given out for prospecting
and risk capital being committed to that endeavour. What was required of
A.G.C. was merely the organization of production from the gold ores to
which access was granted them by the lease. The reward for organizing
that production was to be undisturbed possession of some of the richest
gold ores in the world for a guaranteed period of 90 years. There was
thus to be a siphoning off of the profits of gold production to the
metropole for that inordinately long period, with no provision made for
reinvesting any part of such profits in the local economy. The annual
payments to be made by A.G.C. under the lease, which have been set out
above, were derisive in the light of the income to A.G.C. from its
operation.
In spite of the exploitative nature of the A.G.C. lease and the
doubtful authority of the Governor to grant it, it remained in force
until April 1969. It survived the vesting of all mineral rights in Ghana
in the state which was achieved by the Minerals Act, 1962.21 Although
the Minerals Act declared all minerals in Ghana "vested in the President
on behalf of the Republic of Ghana in trust for the people of Ghana," it
did not seek to expropriate acquired rights and so existing concessions
were not terminated by it. 22 But the regime established by the 1897
lease cried out aloud for restructuring. The first attempt to effect
such restructuring was in 1969 and it is discussed in the next section.
THE 1969 RESTRUCTURING EXERCISE: FEELING TOWARDS
A NEW ORDER
Up to 1969, then, gold production at Obuasi was controlled by a small
transnational corporation.2  It was not surprising that this
profitable business of A.G.C. became a prize in the process of
amalgamations and takeovers which characterise the capitalist system. At
the end of 1968, A.G.C. was taken over by the fast growing Lonrho, a
bigger transnational corporation with interests in many African
countries. The acquisition of A.G.C. was a significant event in the
corporate history of Lonrho.
The Lonrho takeover bid was made as a result of consultations between
it and the Ghana Government. Earlier in 1968, the Ghana Government had
tried to secure a modest restructuring of the 1897 agreement directly
with A.G.C., but A.G.C. would only offer the government 10 of its equity
in exchange for the abolition of royalties and mineral duties. It
further wanted taxation of its profits limited to 50 and a management
fee of £150,000 a year. The government of that period, even though quite
conciliatory to transnational corporations, refused to accept these
terms. Meanwhile, at the government's request Lonrho had been doing a
survey of the government's gold mines. After the failure of the A.G.C.
talks, Lonrho showed interest in the Obuasi mine and discussions with
them eventually led to an understanding with the Ghana Government, on the
basis of which they made their takeover bid for A.G.C. After Lonrho had
successfully taken over A.G.C., the new management of A.G.C. concluded
with the Ghana Government the agreement which became the foundation of
the 1969 restructuring. A.G.C. was a desirable prize for Lonrho because
of A.G.C.'s strong cash position. At the time of the takeover, A.G.C.
had cash reserves worth some £2 million. Lonrho's takeover technique was
to gain access to this cash, using its shares and convertible
debentures. Lonrho paid no cash in the takeover. Over 95 of A.G.C.'s
shareholders accepted Lonrho's offer to exchange Lonrho shares and 7 1/2%
convertible loan stock for their A.G.C. shares. Consequently, pursuant
to s.209(l) of the U.K. Companies Act 1948, Lonrho was able to buy out
the remaining shareholders and to make A.G.C. a wholly owned subsidiary
of Lonrho.
The provisions of the 1969 agreement must now be examined. In the
agreement signed on 15th April, 1969, the Ghana Government for the first
time acquired an ownership interest in the Obuasi mine. The government
was given 25 of shares in A.G.C. in exchange for the grant by government
of a new lease for 50 years from 1 January, 1969 at a yearly rent of
£30,000 in respect of land at Obuasi comprising approximately 100 square
miles. The government was given an option of acquiring a further 20 of
the shares in A.G.C. for cash payable in sterling in Londo. Thus, while
Lonrho had not paid cash for its shares in A.G.C., the government was
required to pay cash, if it wanted to increase its shareholding to 45.
In the original April agreement, there was not even any provision made
for the government to nominate any members of the A.G.C. board, but a
supplemental Agreement of 2 September, 1969 took care of this glaring
deficiency by giving the government the right to nominate four members of
the board of twelve. Although during the discussions, the idea had been
canvassed of establishing a Ghanaian company to take over the assets of
A.G.C., in the final Agreement, A.G.C. was allowed to remain a U.K.
company with headquarters in London.
The combined effect of the two agreements of 1969 was to create a
joint venture between Lonrho and the Ghana Government. The Ghana
Government was the minority shareholder and in a British company at
that. The Ghana Government did not thus acquire even the outward
trappings of control, let alone its substance. One is thus left
wondering at the objective of the Ghana Government in bringing about the
1969 restructuring. Was it to get more information about the operations
of A.G.C. through the government's representation on its board? It must
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have been for some reason other than the acquisition of control, because
the minority representation on the board could hardly give the government
any more influence than it already had. By exercising its legislative
and executive powers as the government on whose territory A.G.C.'s mining
activities were taking place, the government could probably exercise more
influence on corporate policy then through a minority representation on
the board of a British company.
The April 1969 Agreement contained the following clause:
The Corporation shall within eighteen months of the
date of this Agreement submit to the Governor for its
approval a scheme for the training of Ghanaians
recruited specially if necessary for the purpose.
Such scheme shall be directed towards the training of
Ghanaians for employment in the mining industry:
(a) as tradesmen (b) in supervisory posts and
(c) in senior professional and management grades.
While this concern for training mining manpower was commendable, it could
hardly have been the motivation for the restructuring, since it could be
achieved, perhaps better achieved, through administrative powers.
Was the Ghana Government's purpose in the 1969 exercise to improve
its financial earnings from A.G.C.'s enterprise? If this was its
purpose, it also failed in this regard. Under the 1897 Agreement, income
to government from A.G.C.'s enterprise, besides tax income, was on the
basis of the 5% royalty provided for in that Agreement. For this fixed
income, the 1969 arrangement substituted a right to dividends on the
government's 20% shareholding. Since there is no automatic entitlement
to dividends every year, the declaration of dividends being the
discretionary prerogative of the Board, over which the government had no
control, the government sought to safeguard its interest by a provision
in the 1969 agreement24 to the effect that if the dividends declared on
the government's shares in a particular year were less than 5% of the
"gross value" of the minerals sold by A.G.C. in that year (i.e. what the
government would have been entitled to under the old 5% royalty formula),
then A.G.C. was to pay the government an amount equal to the
"deficiency." This retention of the royalty element was even taken to
the length (beneficial to A.G.C.), of providing that dividends paid to
the Government to the extent that they did not exceed the 5% gross value
(and any deficiency payments) were to be made deductible against profits
for income tax purposes and credited against mineral duties to the
government. These points about tax deductibility and the ability to
credit against minerals duty were specifically adverted to and agreed on
in the Supplemental Agreement of September, 1969. This Agreement
provided that until 31 December, 1983, payments to be made by Lonrho or
A.G.C. by way of dividends on the government's 20% shareholding or in
respect of any deficiency between such dividends and the 5% royalty
previously payable were to be allowable deductions in the computation of
tax. From 1 January, 1984, however, these allowable deductions were to
be limited to the deficiency payments. It was also agreed that until 31
December, 1993, there was to be deducted from the minerals duty payable
by A.G.C. a sum equal to the royalty which would have been paid had the
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1897 agreement continued in force. From 1st January, 1994, however, this
privilege was to be limited to the net deficiency payments.
The annual rental of £30,000 was also tax deductible; this meant, in
effect, that the Government paid 55% of it. But this is only one aspect
of the incredible ignoring of the tax consequences of the financial
package involved in the 1969 restructuring. As a result of these tax
consequences, in fact, the Ghana Government incurred losses by reason of
having accepted the 2C% allotment of shares. Under the Income Tax
Decree, 1966,25 "qualified expenditures" are capital expenditures
incurred in connection with the acquisition of a mineral deposit of a
wasting nature. Such qualified expenditures are given an initial capital
allowance of 2C% and subsequent annual allowances of 15%. A consultant
hired by the Ghana Government subsequently estimated that as a result of
these depletion allowances that A.G.C. lay claim to and was granted,
Ghana lost 55% of £2,060,120 which would otherwise be payable as tax to
the Ghana Government and an uncalculated amount in mineral duties. This
tax consequence flowed from the shares being allotted to the Ghana
Government by A.G.C. If, on the other hand, Lonrho as shareholder, and
not A.G.C. had transferred the 20% shares to the government, this loss
could have been averted, since the expenditure would not have been
incurred by A.G.C. The argument A.G.C. made in claiming the capital
allowances was to value the 3,745,674 shares allotted to Government at £1
each. They then claimed this value as a qualified expenditure under the
Income Tax Decree. The losses incurred by the Ghana Government in tax
revenues is an object lesson in the need for competence and a careful
assessment of the implications of all provisions agreed to in
negotiations with transnational corporations. Thus the improvement of
the negotiating skills of third world negotiators with transnational
corporations is clearly a high priority. In the next series of
negotiations with Lonrho, the Ghana Government displayed a much better
negotiating capacity. It is to this next series of negotiations, that we
next turn.
THE-1972-73 NEGOTIATIONS WITH LONRHO: CASESTUDY OF A HOST
GOVERNMENT'S MAJORITY PARTICIPATION IN THE
BUSINESS OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION.
i) INTRODUCTION
In 1972, an event of considerable national significance took place in
Ghana; the civilian government, which had succeeded the military regime
that had negotiated the 1969 accord, was overthrown and the new military
government, the National Redemption Council, which took office on 13
January, 1972, proclaimed a policy of self-reliance with consequences on
its attitude to the role of transnational corporations in the extractive
industries of Ghana. Its policy towards the extractive industries was
made clear in a Government White Paper on State Participation in the
Mining Industry issued in December 1972 to accompany a Decree by which
the State compulsorily participated in mining enterprises. In part, the
White Paper declared as follows:
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This policy of self-reliance is particularly relevant
to the exploitation of the resources of the sub-soil,
which are clearly vested in the State. The Government
position, which is no different from the position of
most countries, is that the major resources of the
sub-soil are part of the public domain not only de
ju but also de facto. The Government, therefore,
has a duty and the right to assume effective control
over the exploitation of these resources to ensure
that the country realises maximum economic benefit
from them. In consonance with recommendations of the
United Nations Commission on Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources in 1961, the exploitation,
development and disposition of such resources, as well
as the import of the foreign capital required for
these purposes, should be in conformity with the rules
and conditions which the people of Ghana freely
consider to be necessary or desirable with regard to
the authorisation, restriction or prohibition of such
activities.
It is well-known that by the virtue of the various
rights and concessions granted under the former
colonial administration in this country, the effective
control of the mining industries, and indeed, of the
entire extractive industries in this country, is in
the hands of foreign companies. Foreign control of
this vital sector of our economy must necessarily
limit our capacity to be self-reliant. The N.R.C.
cannot accept any economic arrangements which deny the
state effective participation in the exploitation of
the country's mineral resources as well as in the
ownership of the productive facilities in connection
therewith. Foreign control of such a vital sector of
our economy must simply give way to State control.
That way lies self-reliance and economic independence.
It is appropriate now to examine the negotiation strategies that the
Ghana Government adopted with a view to acquiring such state control and
with what success. The materials in this section throw some light on the
issue to what extent a third world country can bargain itself out of
dependency on transnational corporations.
ii) ANATOMY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
Given the National Redemption Council's aspirations, as described
above, it is not surprising that soon after assuming power, it set up an
interdisciplinary committee of lawyers, tax experts, geologists etc. to
help in formulating a policy and strategy for participation in the mining
industry. On the whole, the N.R.C.'s dealings with Lonrho were to be
characterised by careful committee work. It was on the advice of this
preparatory committee that the government began negotiations in July,
1972 with a view to acquiring majority shareownership of A.G.C.
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The government negotiating team was lead by Dr. S.K.B. Asante,
co-author of this article, then Solicitor-General of Ghana, and it
included the Commissioner of Income Tax, a private practising lawyer, a
geologist teaching at the University of Ghana and two other geologists in
government service. Tiny Rowland, the Managing-Director of Lonrho, led
the Lonrho team himself and his team included the Managing-Director of
A.G.C. and other employees of A.G.C. two of whom were Ghanaians.
The government negotiating team's tactic at the initial meeting was
to state its negotiating position and then demand accounts and other
financial data from Lonrho for their scrutiny. Therefore, after the
initial meeting, there was a recess to enable these figures to be
produced to the Government team for their study. The negotiations
resumed in mid-August, 1972.
Meanwhile the Lonrho team had also done their homework and at the
resumption of negotiations produced a set of counter-proposals. One of
these counter-proposals was that Lonrho was willing to participate in a
joint venture company in which the Ghana Government would own 55% of the
shares and Lonrho 45% of the shares. However, the assets to be taken
over by the joint venture company should include not only those of
A.G.C., but also those of the state Gold Mining Corporation. This
corporation had been established in 1961 to take over the gold mines of
various British companies which were contemplating shutting down because
their operations were no longer profitable. At the time that Lonrho made
this counter-offer, the State Gold Mining Corporation was also making
losses and therefore their offer was at first sight strange. But it has
to be remembered that Lonrho had been commissioned by the previous
military government, the National Liberation Council, to do a study of
the gold mines of the S.G.M.C. and that they were optimistic about the
future of those mines. Lonrho's counter-offer was therefore a shrewd
attempt to achieve a denationalisation of the gold mines in the state
sector. They in effect hoped to control all the gold mines in Ghana
because in spite of government ownership of the majority shares in the
joint venture company, management and hence actual control would be
vested in Lonrho. Lonrho sweetened this counter-offer by saying that
they would not demand any cash compensation from the government, if this
arrangement were acceded to. They further argued that this arrangement
would avert the dispute over the mode of valuation of Lonrho's shares in
A.G.C. which had already arisen.
As has already been noted, this proposal was very shrewd in view of
the fact that the state mines had been incurring losses. This fact
disposed some members of the negotiating team towards accepting the
counter-offer so that the state mines could be returned to profitability
with the better management they thought Lonrho has capable of producing.
Other members of the negotiating team thought the counter-proposal
totally unacceptable on political grounds. There would be a bad
political loss of face for the government to announce its resolve to
negotiate to capture the commanding heights of the economy only to report
back to the nation that the outcome of these negotiations had been the
handing over to a transnational corporation of assets which previously
were wholly state owned. The government team's response was thus to tell
the Lonrho team that they had no mandate to discuss this new proposal of
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theirs and that the proposal would be referred back to their principal.
An alternative counter-proposal which the Lonrho team put forward was
that their interest in A.G.C. should be completely taken over by the
government. They preferred being bought out completely to the government
proposal to acquire majority shares in their enterprise. The Lonrho team
invited the government to take over their 8U6 shareholding in A.G.C. at
the price at which Lonrho had acquired them on the London Stock Exchange
during their 1968 takeover bid. The total cost to Lonrho had been
£15,182,696 and the team indicated that Lonrho was prepared to accept £14
million for its 80% shareholding to be paid for in cash over a period of
seven years at 6 interest on the reducing balances. It will be recalled
that Lonrho itself had not paid cash for those shares. Further, Lonrho
"volunteered" to take charge of the technical and administrative
management of A.G.C. at no fee during this seven year period of
repayment. Their only demand would be for reimbursement of direct
expenses.
This counter-proposal was also referred back to the government, which
in turn gave a directive to the negotiating team to discuss only the
proposal relating to government majority participation in the business of
A.G.C. on the basis of 55% equity to the government and 45% equity to
Lonrho. Following this directive, negotiations resumed in November on
the government's proposals. To forestall a testy instant rejection of
this proposal, the team asked the Lonrho team to take another recess and
to submit their response to the government proposals in writing after due
and careful consideration of the government's offer. After the recess,
the Lonrho team indicated that they accepted the 55% government
participation in principle and they now concentrated their negotiating
efforts on securing acceptable terms on the basis of which such
participation should take place.
Much of the ensuing negotiations revolved around the question of the
quantum of compensation to be paid to Lonrho. The basic disagreement was
about the mode of computing the value of Lonrho's interest in A.G.C. The
government team put forward a formula that would take account of only the
value of the fixed and current assets of A.G.C. including bullion, in
transit, but excluding any valuation of the 1969 A.G.C. new lease. The
team argued that A.G.C. was not entitled to compensation in respect of
the mining rights embodied in the lease, since the mineral ores were
inalienably vested in the government and the government could not be made
to buy back such ores. This position was flatly rejected by Lonrho.
They argued that the 1969 agreements had given them an expectation
interest which they sought to quantify by reference to the value they had
given for A.G.C.'s shares in 1969. There was a complete impasse on this
issue.
Another issue on which there was disagreement at the resumed
negotiations was that of the composition of the board of the joint
venture company envisaged. Lonrho rejected the government team's
proposal that the government should nominate a majority of the
directors. Lonrho insisted on a board majority of 6 to 5, coupled
however with a provision that two of its directors should be Ghanaians
approved by the government. Lonrho emphasized that it needed majority
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control of the board in order to ensure effective management of the mine
without undue interference in technical matters by the board and also to
enable the consolidation of the accounts of the new joint venture with
the accounts of Lonrho generally. As was to be expected, the government
team was not persuaded by these considerations and insisted on a majority
control of the board as the natural corollary of the government's
majority shareholding.
The third area of basic disagreement which emerged in the
negotiations was on the rate of royalty to be paid by the joint venture
company. The government team had proposed 5%. But the Lonrho team
considered that any rate above 3% would be excessive and therefore
unacceptable.
Although there were other areas of disagreement, the three issues
indicated above were those on which the talks foundered, although
agreement had been reached on some other issues. For instance, Lonrho
had agreed to the term of the 1969 lease being reduced from 50 years to
35 years and to assuming an obligation to ensure a progressive training
of Ghanaians to man all levels of technical and administrative management
of the contemplated joint venture. Lonrho had also agreed to payment of
compensation to them out of the dividends to accrue from the joint
venture, but had insisted on an amortisation period of seven years,
instead of the eight years suggested by the government team. It,
however, demanded an interest rate of 6% on the reducing balances, which
the government team would not accept.
The Lonrho team, particularly the Managing Director, throughout the
negotiations made it clear that they were not interested in a joint
venture that Lonrho would not control. For this reason, in spite of
their having been told that a hundred percent takeover was not within the
purview of the mandate given to the government negotiating team, they
reintroduced their proposals in this direction. Their proposal was that
the government should acquire the 80% interest of Lonrho in A.G.C. at the
net cost to Lonrho of acquiring that interest. Lonrho computed the total
cost to them of A.G.C. on the basis of the offer documents used in the
1968 takeover bid at £1 per share and added £200,000 costs. They
computed this total cost at £15,182,696. The team indicated that for
their 8U6 interest they would accept £14 million with payment over 7
years at 6% interest on the reducing balances. During this period of
repayment, Lonrho would provide technical and administrative management
at no fee, except the reimbursement of its direct expenses.
The government team considered that agreement with Lonrho was not
possible and therefore broke off negotiations and submitted a lengthy
report to government on the course of the negotiations thus far, the
options open to government and the negotiating team's own preferred
option. The strategy of free negotiations had failed and the next stage
in the negotiating process was to see more coercion applied by the
government.
The government negotiating team in their report back to government
took the view that there were three possible courses of action open to
the government following on the breakdown of the negotiations. First,
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the government could nationalise A.G.C. outright; secondly, the
government could issue a Decree imposing its terms for a 55%
participation in the business of A.G.C; and thirdly, the government could
reopen negotiations with Lonrho, fully aware that the outcome of those
negotiations would be less favourable than the minimum terms that the
government had thus far considered acceptable.
The arguments for and against each of these options were canvassed
before the team indicated its own preference for the second option,
namely compulsory participation by government in the business of A.G.C.
on terms to be set out in a Decree. On the option of outright
nationalisation, the team saw its advantages in its beneficial public
relations impact in evidencing the government's uncompromising resolve to
capture the commanding heights of the economy. This would increase the
regime's domestic popularity. This option would also eliminate the need
to agree on several of the issues that needed to be resolved in the joint
venture negotiations. The main issue that would have to be negotiated
under this option would be that of compensation. On the debit side, the
team considered that an outright nationalisation was likely to strain
further the relations between the N.R.C. and Western Governments which
were already strained because of the N.R.C.'s unilateral repudiation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to western creditors. At the same
time as the Lonrho negotiations were going on, proposals had been
submitted by these western creditors for the amicable settlement of this
external debt issue which were more concessionary that any they had ever
put forward and the negotiating team thought that a nationalisation at
that particular point in time might harden the attitudes of the western
countries and make agreement more difficult to reach on the debt issue.
Also the team considered outright nationalisation a socialist expedient,
whilst from their analysis of government statements, they were of the
view that the government was not socialist. The team also feared that
outright nationalisation would adversely affect the investment climate in
Ghana and, in particular, effect the chances of financing a
bauxite-alumina project which was then under active consideration. If
negotiations on the issue of compensation were to break down, the team
was apprehensive that this might lead to confrontation with the British
Government and the consequent likelihood of the suspension of World Bank
lending to Ghana during the period of such confrontation with Britain.
Finally, the team considered that outright nationalisation of A.G.C.
might lead to a disruption of production since there might be a mass
exodus of expatriate technicians, whilst the government's own recruitment
of staff would not yet have been organised. As regards the option of
resuming negotiations with Lonrho, the team considered that its adoption
would lead to the government accepting less favourable terms than it had
hoped for and possibly undermining the government's policy of capturing
the commanding heights of the economy. It was likely to lead to public
disillusionment and the dimunition of the government's bargaining power
in future negotiations with foreign enterprises. But on the plus side,
an adoption of this option would avoid confrontation with Lonrho and
hence ultimately with the United Kingdom Government. This option would
also not adversely affect the investment climate.
But the preferred option of the negotiating team which came to be
adopted by the Government was the option of compulsory participation in
-16-
the business of A.G.C. This option involved imposing a joint venture
arrangement by Decree on Lonrho and thus achieving by Decree what the
previous course of negotiation had been unable to achieve. Obviously,
this was merely a kind of bargaining step, since a joint venture
arrangement must need to be a consensual framework within which partners
work and nobody can be a partner against his will. Recognising that even
this imposed joint venture arrangement would not work without the consent
of Lonrho, the government team recommended a total takeover of the
business of A.G.C. if they should refuse to cooperate on the terms of the
imposed joint venture arrangements. The net effect of this option thus
was to coerce Lonrho into accepting the government's terms for majority
participation in their business. Since this option involved continued
cooperation between Lonrho and the government, the adoption of this
option did not mean the end of negotiation. Rather, the passing of the
Decree imposing the government's terms on Lonrho opened another phrase in
the negotiating process between the two partners.
THE MINING OPERATIONS (GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION) DECREE 1972
AND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS
Having accepted the preferred option of its negotiating team, the
Government on 6 December, 1972 passed the Mining Operations (Government
Participation) Decree 1972.26 The Decree dealt with both the business
of A.G.C. and of the Consolidated African Selection Trust Ltd.
(C.A.S.T.), the latter being a diamond - mining company with whom
negotiations had been going on simultaneously with the Lonrho
negotiations. With regard to A.G.C. the Decree provided as follows:
A new company to be called Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (Ghana)
Ltd. was to be deemed registered under the Companies Code 1963 and this
company was to take over and carry on the business, objects and functions
in Ghana of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation. 55% of the equity
capital of A.G.C. (Ghana) was to be held by the Ghana Government and 45%
by Lonrho Limited. A.G.C. (Ghana) was to have a governing Board
comprising eleven members with six appointed by the government and five
by Lonrho. The Chairman of the Board was to be appointed by the
government. With effect from 1st October, 1972, all assets in Ghana of
A.G.C. were to be deemed transferred to A.G.C. (Ghana).
Technical management of A.G.C. (Ghana), however, was placed in the
hands of Lonrho by the Decree.27 Such technical management was to be
provided upon such terms and conditions as were to be agreed with the
government. Moreover, all persons employed by A.G.C. in respect of their
operations in Ghana were to be transferred to the employment of A.G.C.
(Ghana) and they were to enjoy terms and conditions of service no less
favourable than those applicable to them immediately before the
transfer.28
The Decree also cancelled with effect from 1st October, 1972 all
leases, concessions and other mining rights held by A.G.C., but gave
authority for a new mining right to be granted to A.G.C. (Ghana).
Fending such new grant, A.G.C. (Ghana) was authorised to conduct mining
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operations in the same area in which it operated immediately before 1st
October, 1972.29 Provision was made for the payment of an annual
royalty by A.G.C. (Ghana).30 Such royalty was to be prescribed by the
Commissioner responsible for Finance by executive instrument, and it was
not to exceed six percent of the market value of the minerals produced by
A.G.C. (Ghana). This royalty was to be in addition to any income tax or
minerals duty or any other tax or duty payable by the Company. The
royalty was however to be an allowable deduction for the purposes of
ascertaining the income of A.G.C. (Ghana) for income tax purposes.
On the controversial issue of compensation, the Decree provided as
follows: The government was to pay fair compensation for the equity
capital it was acquiring. It was to pay Lonrho 35% of the total value of
the assets of A.G.C. The value of these assets was to be "calculated on
the basis of their net written down value for income tax purposes on the
books of A.G.C."31 as of 1st October, 1972. However, the value of
stores calculated in this manner was to be subject to adjustment in
accordance with a technical valuation.
This Decree set the framework for the next stage of the negotiating
process between the Ghana Government and Lonrho. The Ghanian team to the
next round of the negotiations was under the chairmanship of Mr. Beecham,
then Deputy Secretary to the National Redemption Council. Formally, the
chairman remained Dr. S.K.B. Asante, but as he was involved with other
negotiations with other mining companies, the effective leader of the
Ghanaian team became Mr. Beecham. Other members of the team were a
private chartered accountants, a senior official of the Bank of Ghana, a
Principal State Attorney, the Commissioner of Income Tax, a private
practising lawyer, the Executive Secretary of the Aluminum Industries
Commission (a geologist), with a Principal Commercial Officer from the
Ministry of Trade as the Secretary.
This new Committee's mandate was to hold further negotiations with
Lonrho (and C.A.S.T.) on issues arising out of the Mining Operations
(Government Participation) Decree 1972. Negotiating sessions took place
with a Lonrho team between January 22, 1973 and 6 February, 1973 The
Lonrho team was led by F. A. Butcher, Financial Director of Lonrho. The
other members of the team were the Managing Director of A.G.C. and other
employees of A.G.C. (including some Ghanaians) as well as an accountant
from Lonrho.
The main issues for negotiation in this round were the issues of
compensation and of the terms and scope of the technical management to be
provided by Lonrho. The proposed Memorandum and Articles of Association
(in Ghana called "the Regulations") of A.G.C. also had to be discussed.
The most heated discussion related to the issue of compensation. The
Ghanaian team adopted the position that the provisions of the Mining
Operations (Government Participation) Decree were not negotiable, except
where these provisions themselves allowed for negotiation. Therefore on
the issue of compensation, the Ghanaian team saw its task as implementing
the compensation criterion embodied in section 4 of the Decree. They
therefore saw their task as determining the quantum of compensation
according to the book value criterion and negotating the method, period
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and currency of payment. Section 4 of the Decree reads in full as
follows:
1. The Government shall in accordance with this
section pay to Lonrho and C.A.S.T. respectively
fair compensation in respect of the equity capital
held by the Government by virtue of this Decree.
2. In respect of A.G.C. (Ghana) the Government shall
pay to Lonrho a sum equal to fifty-five per centum
of the total value of the assets described in
subsection (4) of section 2 of this Decree minus
the value at the commencement of this Decree of
twenty per centum of the total assets of A.G.C.
within Ghana and outside Ghana (including gold
bullion in transit) representing the value of the
twenty per centum equity capital held by the
Government in A.G.C. immediately before the
commencement of this Decree.
3. The value of the assets referred to in subsection
(4) of section 3 shall be calculated on the basis
of their net written down value for income tax
purposes on the books of A.G.C. and C.A.S.T.
respectively as at the commencement of this
Decree, except that the value of stores as so
calculated shall be subject to adjustment in
accordance with a technical valuation.
At the initial meeting, the Lonrho team argued that section 4(1), set
out above, implied that compensation should be agreed between the parties
and not imposed upon one party by the other party. In other words,
compensation could not be fair, if its mode of assessment was
unilaterally determined. They therefore further argued that s.4(l) of
the Decree was inconsistent with the principle of fair compensation laid
down in s.4(1). The Lonrho team also drew attention to the fact that
section 4 referred to only the assets of A.G.C., without mentioning its
liabilities. They therefore contended that the valuation should be based
on only the assets of A.G.C. and that A.G.C.'s liabilities should be
taken over by A.G.C. (Ghana). In other words, given the Government
team's insistence on the non-negotiability of the provisions on the
Decree, the Lonrho team seemed to have adopted a tactic of using the
language of that same Decree to further their negotiating objectives.
In response to these points, the Ghana team maintained the position
that the word "compensation" in s.4(1) of the Decree merely meant the
"price" and that s.4(1) was quite consistent with s.4(4) because s.4(4)
provided a fair basis of valuation. On the issue of the Decree's
omission of reference to A.G.C.'s liabilities, the team argued that the
assets of A.G.C. should be interpreted to mean net assets; in other
words, total assets less liabilities. They further contended that if the
valuation was to be based on assets minus liabilities, then A.G.C.
(Ghana) should take over the liabilities of A.G.C. If, however, the
Lonrho's teams interpretation was to be accepted and the valuation was
based on only the assets of A.G.C., then Lonrho should be responsible for
A.G.C.'s liabilities. The Ghana team considered this issue of
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liabilities to be one of statutory interpretation and therefore referred
it to the Attorney-General's Department for clarification. The requested
clarification was given in a letter to the team by the Chief
Parliamentary Draftsman who said among other things:
The Decree does not mention the payment of
liabilities....I am of the view that, for assessment
of compensation, only the value of the assets has to
be taken into account, since it is the assets valued
as above stated which are taken over by the new
companies and 55% of which is in effect taken over by
the Government. The respective liabilities are to
continue to be borne by A.G.C. and C.A.S.T. as the
case may be.
The Ghana team considered itself bound by this view, but Lonrho totally
rejected this position and so no agreement could be reached on this
matter of liabilities.
On the matter of valuation, Lonrho also raised the point that there
were some assets of A.G.C. such as plantations and gold in course of
treatment which were not normally taken into account for income tax
purposes. These assets, they complained, were ignored by the criterion
of valuation laid down in s.4(4). To this point, the Ghana team
responded that the value of A.G.C.'s assets for tax purposes could have
been higher, if capital allowances were not permitted. Accordingly, they
felt themselves unable to depart from the criterion laid down in s.4(4),
although the Lonrho team were asked to submit for consideration a
comprehensive list of all their assets exempted from taxation.
Lonrho again raised its point about having bought A.G.C. for £15
million and that this should be taken into account. Their team argued
that the £15 million was paid in anticipation of profits and therefore
that the basis of valuation should not exclude reference to future
profits. They insisted that if the Government team insisted on the
valuation criterion of s.4(4), they would have to refer the matter to the
Lonrho board. However, agreement was reached that the accountants of the
two sides should independently appraise Lonrho's figures within the
provisions of the Decree and report back to the negotiating meeting.
Ultimately, the Ghana side, basing themselves on the figures in the
accounts submitted by Lonrho offered them £2.8 million (that is 35% of £8
million) whereas Lonrho asked for £6.1 million. There was complete
impasse on this point.
As regards the currency of payment, the Lonrho team insisted upon
payment in sterling, while the government team was equally insistent upon
payment in cedis because A.G.C. operated in a cedi context. They argued
that later permission could be granted for the transfer of the cedis in
accordance with Ghana's Exchange Control Act. Lonrho accordingly sought
a guarantee from the government team that permission would be given for
the prompt transfer of the compensation in cedis, but the Ghana side
refused to give any such guarantee, arguing that it would be undesirable
for any government to bind its central bank in this fashion. The
Committee could only recommend to government that it should use its good
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offices to ensure that the cedi compensation paid to Lonrho was
transferred as soon as practicable. The government team proposed a
five-year payment period for the compensation. There was to be an
initial payment of ten percent of the compensation due, and the remaining
amount was to be paid in instalments with 2 1/2% tax free interest.
These terms were rejected by Lonrho. Thus on the issue of compensation,
its quantum, mode of payment and duration of payment, no agreement could
be reached. Up to the time of the writing of this article in 1980, there
was still no agreement. According to a member of the management of
A.G.C. (Ghana) in 1980, the Government sent a cheque in cedis to Lonrho
for the value of their assets in accordance with s.4(4) but the cheque
was returned. Accordingly, A.G.C. (Ghana) has adopted the practice of
showing on its Balance Sheet an item entitled "Capital Suspense," which a
note to the Balance Sheet explains as representing the "Net Assets taken
over by Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (Ghana) Limited from Ashanti
Goldfields Corporation as at 1st October, 1932.'32
As regards the agreement on management of A.G.C. (Ghana) by Lonrho,
the negotiating technique adopted was for each side to submit its draft
proposals. At the first meeting on this issue, however, Ghana's draft
was used as the basis for negotiation and it was discussed paragraph by
paragraph. At the next meeting, however, certain points raised in the
Lonrho draft but not raised in the Ghana draft were discussed. These
points related to the Government of Ghana ensuring that exchange control
permission was given for sterling to be made available to Lonrho in
respect of payments under the management agreement for staff remittances,
stores purchases and also for dividends. Lonrho also wanted the payments
of interest on sums advanced by the Lonrho group to A.G.C. (Ghana) for
stores and other items. Furthermore, it wanted dividends and interest
due it to be exempt from Ghana tax and dividends payable to it to be
remitted promptly to London. Its draft also provided that the formation
expenses of the new company should be borne by the Ghana Government and
that the regulations of the new company should contain adequate
protection for the minority. Lonrho also sought exemption from balancing
charges, stamp duty and all other forms of taxes in respect of the
transfer of assets in accordance with the participation Decree.
Agreement was reached on the management arrangements and an agreement
on management services was eventually executed on 11 April, 1974. The
agreement was between the Government of Ghana and Lonrho and it provided
as follows: Lonrho undertook, subject to the overall control and
direction of the Board of A.G.C. (Ghana) to provide, at the expense of
A.G.C. (Ghana), the technical management of A.G.C. (Ghana). Such
technical management was defined to comprise a list of activities listed
in a schedule to the agreement. The list included proper operation of
the mine in accordance with the Mining Regulations; preparation and
execution of annual and long term programmes for mining, mine
development, diamond drilling, shaft sinking and exploration; preparation
of annual working cost budgets and control of expenditure relative to the
budgets set; preparation of detailed programmes for engineering
construction and control of their execution, etc. There were
thirty-seven items on this list of activities comprising the management
services to be rendered by Lonrho.
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The management contract stipulated that the Board of A.G.C. was not
to involve itself in the day-to-day running of A.G.C. (Ghana), but was to
limit itself to:
(i) matters of policy such as approving annual and
long-term programmes for mining, mine development,
drilling and exploration, approval of annual budget,
approval of capital expenditure, determination of
sales policy; and
(ii) giving general guidelines for the operation of
A.G.C. (Ghana).
Lonrho was to nominate a suitable person for appointment by the Board as
managing-director, while the Government was to do the same for
appointment as the deputy managing-director. The managing director or,
in his absence, the deputy managing director was to be responsible for
the day to day operations of A.G.C.
In agreeing to this demarcation of functions between the Board and
the management of A.G.C. (Ghana), the government's negotiating team said
that their aim was "to ensure efficiency and profitability." In their
report to the government on the course of the negotiations, they stated:
To this end, we were prepared, within reasonable
limits, to give the technical managers a free hand in
the discharge of their management functions. We
considered it desirable to guard against undue
interference by the Board of Directors in the
day-to-day management of the companies. In all this,
however, we tried to avoid any dimunition of the
prerogatives of the Board of Directors in policy
decisions and in the general control and supervision
of the companies. All vital decisions affecting the
companies would have to be approved by the Boards of
Directors.
During the negotiations, the principle was accepted that no fee was
to be payable for the provision of the technical management services.
However, it was agreed that certain special services that A.G.C. depended
on Lonrho for were not to be included in the management agreement.
Rather, they should be the subject of a different agreement to be
concluded between A.G.C. (Ghana) and Lonrho, and not between the
Government and Lonrho. The reason for leaving this agreement in
negotiation between Lonrho and A.G.C. (Ghana) was stated as follows by
the government negotiating team in their report to government:
We thought the Board of Directors of the companies
would be in a more favourable position than we were to
determine, in relation to the companies' resources and
comparable rates elsewhere, the type of specialist
services they would require and the terms under which
CAST and Lonrho, should be engaged to provide such
services.
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Accordingly, the management agreement contained the following clauses:
(6) Except where Lonrho is unable to provide any
particular service, A.G.C. (Ghana) shall use
exclusively the special services provided by Lonrho
that it may require. To this end, A.G.C. (Ghana) and
Lonrho shall agree on the services to be provided,
including payment for them. Such an Agreement shall
be reviewed at not more than five yearly intervals.
(7) Apart from payments that may be made by A.G.C.
(Ghana) for the services provided by Lonrho under
clause 6 above, no fee shall be payable to Lonrho for
assuming the Technical Management of A.G.C. (Ghana).
The management agreement was to remain in force at least five years
from 1st October, 1972. After five years it could be terminated by
either party by 12 months' written notice. After three years it was to
be open for review, but any agreed alterations were not to become
effective until the end of the first five-year period. However, for as
long as any compensation due to Lonrho in respect of the acquisition by
the Government of the 35% extra interest in A.G.C. remained unpaid, the
Government was to have no right to terminate the agreement. It was
further provided that:
If during the course of the period when compensation
is payable there is an unreconcilable difference in a
review of the terms of the Agreement, then the matter
shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with
paragraph 14 hereunder.
This paragraph 14 provides for the reference of disputes arising out of
the Agreement to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes of the World Bank.
As requested by Lonrho during the negotiations, the Government
undertook to ensure that A.G.C. (Ghana) was exempted from balancing
charges, balancing allowances, stamp duty and all other forms of taxes,
charges, duties or fees in respect of the transfer of assets in
accordance with the Mining Operations (Government Participation) Decree
1972. But the other tax concessions sought by Lonrho were not allowed.
On training, Lonrho undertook to advise the Board of A.G.C. (Ghana)
and also to implement, at the expense of A.G.C. (Ghana), an approved
training scheme for the Ghanaian staff of A.G.C. (Ghana) to enable
Ghanaians to replace expatriate employees within a stated reasonable
period.
The agreement for the provision of special services by Lonrho to
A.G.C. (Ghana) was duly concluded on 20 December, 1974. The agreement
was given retrospective effect to 1 October, 1972 and it was to remain in
force for 5 years at least. After the 5 years it could be terminated by
12 months written notice by either party. Like the management agreement,
it could be reviewed after the end of the third year, but any agreed
modifications were not to be implemented before the end of the five year
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period. Again, like the management agreement, it could not be terminated
by the Government while any compensation remained due to Lonrho in
respect of the Government's participation in A.G.C. The agreement
contained a provision identical with the one already noted in connection
with the management agreement for a reference to the ICSID of any
unreconcilable difference in a review of the terms of the Agreement.
The services that Lonrho undertook to provide were:
(a) The secondment of the Managing Director.
(b) The provision of such consultancy and other
special services as may be required by A.G.C.
(Ghana).
(c) The technical inspection and approval of all
goods ordered through London.
(d) The selection of such expatriate staff as may be
recruited for the mine and the general
administration of expatriate staff and their
dependents when not in Ghana.
These services were to be provided in exchange for an annual fee of
£200,000 payable quarterly in advance to London. This fee was exclusive
of air fares and other travelling and incidental expenses reasonably
incurred by consultants and other staff of Lonrho to perform their duties
for A.G.C. (Ghana). Such expenses were to be borne by A.G.C. (Ghana).
The services agreement contained the provision on interest payment that
had first been put forward by Lonrho in the negotiation for the
management agreement. The provision read:
Where expenditure is made by Lonrho on behalf of
A.G.C. (Ghana) in respect of advances to staff or
other approved outgoings, interest shall be payable to
Lonrho from the date of such expenditure to date of
refund at the current overdraft rate payable by Lonrho
in London.
The dispute settlement clause in the agreement read as follows:
In the event of any irreconcilable disagreement
between the parties as to the interpretation or
operation of this Agreement then A.G.C. (Ghana) and
Lonrho will each appoint an arbiter to give a decision
on the matter in dispute. Should the arbiters fail to
agree they shall refer the matter to the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes of
Washington, D.C. whose decision shall be final and
binding on both parties.
Finally, the remaining main issue that was discussed in this final
phase of the negotiations between Lonrho and the Ghana Government was the
regulations of A.G.C. (Ghana). This was not a very contentious issue and
broad agreement was reached on most of the provisions. The main matter
calling for negotiation was the issue of minority protection. Lonrho
feared that government control of the Board might be used to make A.G.C.
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(Ghana) pursue objectives other than commercial profitability, which was
Lonrho's objective. Lonrho therefore requested minority protection on
the following matters:
(i) The expenditure by the Company of any
commitments in respect of any expansion of an
existing mining operation or facility, or the
making of any expenditure, contribution,
disbursement, contract or commitment in any
business or undertaking which may be considered
by the "A" directors or the "B" directors to be
outside the ordinary course of its business;
(ii) the issue of additional "A" or "B" Ordinary
Shares or the creation or issue of any other
class of shares, or of securities convertible
into-shares or the borrowing of any funds
whether by the issue of bonds, or otherwise;
(iii) the determination of appropriations and the
accounting procedures to be adopted for the
determination of profits and dividends under the
Regulations;
(iv) the exercise or modification of any of the
powers of the directors to borrow money or grant
guarantees or create any charge on any assets of
the Company;
v) the making of any loan to, or any guarantee of a
liability of, any person or company, or the
making of any investment or the sale of any
shares in a subsidiary;
(vi) the sale of any products:
(a) other than for cash; or
(b) at a price or conditions other than those
in general application and use in the
relevant market; and
(vii) any act, dealing, arrangement or transaction
that is not entered into for the benefit of the
commercial operations of the Company and for the
benefit of its shareholders as a whole.
In response to this request the Government side expressed itself
opposed to the general idea of express provisions on minority
protection. They argued that when the Government held 20% shares in
A.G.C. it was given no minority protection. The government team further
argued that Ghana's Companies Code contained adequate provisions on the
protection of minority shareholders. They therefore insisted that the
general rule of decisions by majority should apply to Board decisions.
The team considered that accepting Lonrho's proposals on minority
protection would rob the government of the incidents of its majority
shareholding. Accordingly, the team refused to accept most of Lonrho's
proposals on this score. But the team did make a concession to the
Lonrho side on some matters that it considered innocuous. This
concession is now contained in paragraph 68 of A.G.C. (Ghana)'s
regulations and it reads as follows:
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In addition to any other applicable requirements of
law, the following actions and recommendations
therefore to the members will require the affirmative
vote of a majority of 8 directors:
(i) Any disposal of all or of any substantial
part of the assets of the Company or the
assignment or grant of any of its mining or
other rights to others;
(ii) the creation or acquisition of any
subsidiary of the company or the transfer
of any cash or other assets to any such
subsidiary;
(iii) the making of any purchase at a price or on
conditions less favourable than those
applicable in the relevant market;
(iv) the appointment of any committee or local
board or attorney whose powers include the
doing of any of the acts specified in this
Regulation;
(v) the appointment of the Auditors of the
Company.
As regards the composition of the Board, agreement was reached that
there were not to be more than eleven directors. Of these, the holders
of "A" shares were to appoint not more than six and the holders of "B"
shares were to appoint not more than five. The Chairman of the Board was
to be appointed by the holders of the majority of "A" shares and the
Vice-Chairman by the holders of the majority of "B" shares. In the
absence of the Chairman, one of the "A" directors was to be appointed to
act as Chairman. As can be deducted from the above references to "A" and
"B" shares, there was a division of the shares into classes. The
regulations provided that the shares of the company were to consist of
"A" shares of no par value and "B" shares of no par value in the
proportion of 55 "A" shares for every 45 "B" shares. These "A" and "B"
shares are to rank pari passu in all respects, except where the
Regulations specifically provided to the contrary. The company was
registered with 5.5 million A shares of no par value subscribed by the
Government and 4.5 million B shares subscribed by Lonrho. Of these, up
to 1980 only 550 A shares and 450 B shares had been issued with a total
cash consideration of £41,000.
The Regulations also contain a provision requiring mandatory payments
of dividends out of the consolidated net profits of A.G.C. subject only
to certain specified deductions. The provision is in the following terms:
(35a) Subject to Regulation 36, an amount equal to
the consolidated net profits of the company and its
subsidiaries (if any) as shown in the audited accounts
of the Company after deduction therefrom only of
appropriations in respect of capital expenditure in
excess of the depreciation charged and expenditure for
exploration and prospecting and mine development and
of reserves for necessary working capital having
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regard to market conditions and short term liquidity
requirements of the Company as may in each case be
approved by the directors and, subject to an
affirmative vote of eight of the directors, any other
appropriations for the accounting period of the
Company ending on 30th September, 1973, and each
subsequent accounting period, shall be paid as
dividends. The "consolidated net profits" shall mean
the consolidated net profits of the company and its
subsidiaries after taxation is disclosed in the
consolidated profit and loss account, or if the
company has no subsidiary or subsidiaries, the profit
and loss account, determined in accordance with the
accounting principles and procedures (including a
provision for depreciation) determined by the
directors and so that any appropriation deducted as
aforesaid in earlier years and considered by the
directors to be no longer required shall be added to
the sums available for dividends.... "
Regulation 36 in turn provides:
(a) the company will, after such payment, be able to
pay its debts as they fall due;
(b) the amount of such payment does not exceed the
amount of the Company's income surplus
immediately prior to the making of such payment.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESTRUCTURED ARRANGEMENTS
Pursuant to its creation by the Mining Operations (Government
Participation) Decree 1972, A.G.C. (Ghana) took over the business of
A.G.C. with effect from 1 October, 1972 and began operations even before
its Regulations had been agreed upon and registered and before the
conclusion of the management and special services agreements. The
Ghanaian Head of State inaugurated the new company on 26 January, 1973.
In spite of the failure to reach agreement on compensation and in spite
of the intransigence of Lonrho earlier in the negotiations, the parties
to the joint venture arrangements seem to have evolved a harmonious
working relationship. In the review by the Chairman of the Board of the
new company's first year of operations, he said:
The new Company started functioning without finalised
regulations or formal agreements covering the
management and technical services to be provided by
LONRHO LIMITED. The question of compensation had not
been settled. Under NRCD 132, however, the Company is
deemed to have been registered under the Companies
Code 1963, as from 1st October, 1972.
Despite these outstanding issues, a remarkable
degree of harmony has existed on the Board, and no
difficulties have been experienced.
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Interviews held with the Managing Director of AGC (Ghana) in 1979
confirmed the existence of these harmonious working relations between the
shareholders. In the view of the Managing Director, the new joint
venture arrangements had not adversely affected the running of the mine.
The problems facing the company had not been caused by the government
participation but rather by the deteriorating balance of payments
position of Ghana. The company had in recent years encountered
difficulties in obtaining adequate foreign exchange to buy stores and
spares. This had affected the production of the company. He considered
the Lonrho connection very useful in these recent years since even before
the company could establish letters of credit for its stores, Lonrho had
often shipped these stores to the company on credit. The balance of
payments problems had also put the company two years in arrears in its
payments to Lonrho for its special services. Dividends also could not be
transferred.
As regards the government's financial take from A.G.C. (Ghana), this
has been high. In accordance with the Mining Operations (Government
Participation) Decree 1972, the company pays royalty in addition to
income tax and minerals duty. Minerals duty is levied pursuant to the
Minerals Duty Decree 1975 (N.R.C.D. 346) as amended by the Minerals Duty
(Amendment) Decree 1976 (S.M.C.D. 48). The rates of the duty in 1979
were as specified in the latter Decree as follows:
FIELD RATIO3 3  RATE OF DUTY
Over 0 and up to 25% 5% of the value of minerals won.
Over 25 and up to 45% 10 of the value of minerals won.
Over 45 and up to 60% 15% of the value of minerals won.
Over 60 and up to 75% 20% of the value of minerals won.
Over 75 and up to 100% 25% of the value of minerals won.
Yield in relation to A.G.C. (Ghana) is the gross proceeds of its
bullion sales, less production costs. Minerals duty is levied, not on
this yield, but rather on the relation of this yield to the value of the
minerals (or the gross proceeds of the bullion sold) expressed as a
percentage. This mode of levying tax on mineral production enables
account to be taken of profitability. It is not a tax on production
simpliciter. But the royalty levied pursuant to the Mining Operations
(Government Participation) Decree 1972 is a tax on production
simpiciter. In an interview, the relevant tax official in Ghana
indicated that the yield ratio of A.G.C. (Ghana) is usually between 30
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and 45 per cent with a consequent rate of duty of 10 per cent. He
revealed that in the year ended June 1978, however, the yield ratio was
nil since the operational cost exceeded the gross proceeds of sales of
bullion.
In addition to minerals duty and royalty, A.G.C. (Ghana) has to pay
income tax. The basic income tax statute in 1979 when the research for
the article was done was the Income Tax Decree 1975 (S.M.C.D. 5).
According to the Fifth Schedule to this Decree, mining companies were to
pay income tax at the rate of 55%. The Income Tax (Amendment) Decree
1977 (S.M.C.D. 120) however had reduced this rate to 50%.
Table A below is a table of the revenue and other income derived from
A.G.C. (Ghana) by the Ghana Government. The figures do not include
revenue derived from the Special Export Levy on Gold Decree 1972, since
these figures were not specified in the Annual Reports of A.G.C.
(Ghana).34 This decree imposed a special export levy at the rate of
$2.50 per fine ounce troy in respect of each ounce of gold exported from
Ghana by any person after the first 100,000 fine ounces troy of gold
exported.
In his review of operations for the year ended 30th September, 1976
the Chairman of A.G.C. complained of the cumulative effect of these
taxes, particularly those on production. He said:
No review of the past year's results would be complete
without reference to mining taxation. A large
proportion of total tax paid is assessed directly on
gross value of mineral won and not on profitability.
Thus, as profitability falls, an increasing percentage
of working profit is taken as tax. A point is reached
when payments in respect of tax exceed working
profit. In the case of Ashanti Goldfields, although
charges in respect of Minerals Duty, Royalty, Export
Levy and Company Tax decreased from 30,391,311 in 1975
to 13,159,510 in 1976, the percentage of working
profit represented by those figures rose from 73% to
84%. In the current year the percentage has risen to
85%. The effect will be to leave the Company short of
working capital and unless some action is taken the
long-term results could be very serious indeed.35
CONCLUDING REMARKS
There is little doubt that the 1973-74 negotiations with Lonrho
enabled the Ghana Government to effect a transformation of its relations
with the transnational corporation that had been exploiting the Obuasi
gold deposits. It can be said that the negotiations were a financial
success, from the point of view of the Ghana Government. The
negotiations were unable to break the control of the transnational
corporation on the mining activity at Obuasi. These negotiations thus
illustrate how difficult it is for a third world host government to
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bargain itself out of dependency on a transnational corporation that has
controlled a particular sector of its mining industry. Through the
device of management contracts, technical services agreements and other
such agreements such transnational corporations are able to retain
control of their enterprise, even after losing ownership control. Third
world countries continue to negotiate for and accept such management and
technical services agreements because of deficiencies in their
technological, technical and managerial capacities. The continued
exercise of control by transnational corporations through such agreements
is thus a reflection of the technological dependency from which most
third world countries have found it difficult to emerge.
The improved financial benefits to Ghana under the 1972-74
restructured arrangements, however, show what skilful negotiations can
achieve for third world host governments. The conduct of Lonrho in
accepting the imposition of terms by the Ghana Government is also
instructive of the degree of give that transnational corporations may
exhibit, if host states negotiate hard enough. In this Ghanaian case
study, one observes the extraordinary phenomenon of a transnational
corporation, part of whose assets have been expropriated, but, which
nevertheless co-operates with the expropriating host state even though
there is still no agreement on the compensation to be paid for the assets
expropriated.
It is on the issue of control that the limits of what is achievable
by negotiations begin to be exposed. Bargaining takes place on the basis
of give and take and therefore necessarily reflects the relative
bargaining strength of the negotiating parties. When commentators decry
inept bargaining by third world countries, what they mean is that such
countries do not often take stock of their true bargaining potential and
realise that potential. But if, on the objective facts, one party is
dependent upon the other for a vital resource, it is hardly possible to
bargain himself out of that dependency, unless the other party is not a
smart negotiator. Thus where there is a technological dependence by a
host state on a transnational corporation, the technique of negotiation
will not enable it to eliminate this dependency. There has to be an
effort made to reduce the technological and technical dependence by
appropriate manpower development as well as research and development
policies. The bargaining potential of the host state will be much
improved when it has the technical capacity to run the enterprise it
wishes to control. But even though a host country cannot easily bargain
itself out of technological dependency, the kinds of terms it negotiates
for can facilitate or impede its development of technological
self-sufficiency in a particular economic sector.
As regards gold-mining and even gold-refining, it is believed that
the technical, technological and managerial capacities required to
undertake them are not so complex as to be unattainable by Ghanaians
reasonably soon. The 1972-74 restructured arrangements should have
served merely as the basis on which the Ghanaian authorities should have
planned and moved in the direction of Ghanaian management and exclusive
ownership of the goldmine. Though the results of the negotiations were
financially beneficial, they could not constitute the end of the
negotiating trail. Unfortunately, however, there has been no change in
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the joint-venture arrangements since the end of the negotiations in
1974. After the initial five-year period, the management and special
services agreements were renewed without any change of terms. Before the
renewal, there had been some discussion of replacing the
Managing-Director with a Ghanaian Government nominee. But it would have
been incongruous for the management agreement to have been renewed,
whilst at the same time stipulating that the Managing-Director was to be
a government nominee. The fact is that management powers are primarily
vested in the Managing-Director and therefore whoever nominates the
Managing-Director should be the one with responsibility for the
management of the company.
The real discussion should therefore have centred on whether the
agreements were to be renewed or not. As it turned out, they were
renewed. It is doubtful whether the A.G.C. Board has implemented a
sufficiently massive training programme such as to give Ghanaians the
technical, managerial and technological capacity to take over the
complete running of gold-mining at Obuasi and thus enable termination of
the management and technical services agreements which have enabled
Lonrho to remain in control at Obuasi.
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